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ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SPEECH AND ACTION
Frederick Schauer∗
Does the First Amendment rest on a mistake? More specifically, is the First
Amendment’s necessary distinction between speech and action fundamentally
unsustainable?
The First Amendment, in relevant part, protects “the freedom of speech.”1
By contrast, the First Amendment does not protect simply “freedom,” or
“liberty.” And thus it appears, initially and obviously, that the First
Amendment’s protections extend to some acts or events or behaviors but not
others. Indeed, not only the First Amendment but also any coherent principle
of freedom of speech presupposes a meaningful distinction between the
activities encompassed by the principle and those that are not. Loosely and
preliminarily, we can label the former “speech” and the latter “action.”2 And
because any non-vacuous account of a free speech principle is premised on the
idea that being an act of speech in the relevant sense grants to that act a degree
of protection from restriction not granted to non-speech acts causing equivalent
consequences,3 some sort of distinction between speech and action is a
∗ David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia. This Article was
prepared for the Emory University School of Law’s Randolph W. Thrower Symposium, February 5, 2015, on
“The New Age of Communication: Freedom of Speech in the 21st Century.” Earlier versions were presented at
the University of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law; the Harvard Kennedy School; the University
of Chicago Law School; the New York University Colloquium on Political Philosophy; and the University of
Lucerne. I have profited from reactions and questions on those occasions, as well as from comments on earlier
drafts from Mary Anne Case, Aziz Huq, Leslie Kendrick, Liam Murphy, Micah Schwartzman, Samuel
Scheffler, David Strauss, John Tasioulas, and Alex Tsesis.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 By way of emphasizing the preliminary nature of the terminology, I do not at this point in the analysis
want anything to turn on the word “action,” especially because all speech is a form of action (or conduct). But
the basic idea is that of a distinction between speech and non-speech behavior, or between the behavior that we
designate as “speech” and the behavior that we do not.
3 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 3–14 (1982) (analyzing the
necessary conditions for a distinct Free Speech Principle); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of
Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 204 (1972) [hereinafter Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression]
(“The doctrine of freedom of expression is generally thought to single out a class of ‘protected acts’ which it
holds to be immune from restrictions to which other acts are subject.”). Although Scanlon now believes that
the influential account he offered in 1972 is “mistaken in important respects,” T.M. Scanlon, Comment on
Baker’s Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 319 (2011) [hereinafter Scanlon, Comment on
Baker’s Autonomy]; see also T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression,
40 U. PITT. L. REV. 519, 530–34 (1979) [hereinafter Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of
Expression], the subsequent narrowing of his earlier position, even if relevant to taking the earlier article as a
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necessary condition for a viable principle of freedom of speech. But unless
there are free-speech-relevant attributes that are possessed by speech but not by
action, the distinction between speech and action, at least as a matter of free
speech theory, cannot do the work that appears to be required of it.
Although some kind of free-speech-relevant distinction between speech and
action is thus a necessary condition for a meaningful free speech principle, it is
by no means clear that such a distinction can be maintained. There is, to be
sure, a difference between an actual fire and shouting fire in a crowded
theater,4 just as there is a difference among a pipe, a picture of a pipe, and a
verbal description of a pipe.5 In some contexts, distinctions between words and
things and between speech and action plainly exist. But the existence of such a
distinction in some contexts does not entail the conclusion that the everyday
distinction between speech and action will mark anything of free speech
significance, nor that the distinction can carry the weight that any meaningful
principle of free speech must demand of it.
Controversies over the existence (or not) of a distinction between speech
and action have occasionally appeared as weapons in contemporary debates
about hate speech and pornography, with proponents of regulation questioning
the distinction6 and opponents accusing their adversaries of failing to grasp a

self-standing contribution usable or not on its own terms, does not touch the basic analytic point about the
structure of a free speech principle.
Although the most obvious application of the distinction set out in the previous paragraph is with
respect to a differential immunity from restriction for speech and non-speech behavior causing equivalent
harm or other negative consequences, the distinction between speech and non-speech behavior, as articulated
in the text, could also arise in the context of positive rather than negative consequences. See Scanlon, A Theory
of Freedom of Expression, supra, at 204. For example, if there were an affirmative obligation on the part of
government to subsidize speech-relevant activities, a free speech principle would generate a greater obligation
to subsidize or otherwise support speech than to subsidize or support non-speech activities bringing equivalent
benefits. What is key is the differential, and not whether the differential attaches to the restrictive as opposed
to the supportive activities of the agent against whom the free speech claim is offered. See Leslie Kendrick,
Free Speech as a Special Right (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
4 Cf. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”).
5 René Magritte, The Treachery of Images (1928–1929) (“Ceci n’est pas une pipe”).
6 See, e.g., RAE LANGTON, SEXUAL SOLIPSISM: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON PORNOGRAPHY AND
OBJECTIFICATION 27–37, 103–16 (2009) (drawing on speech-act theory to consider speech as action rather
than distinct from it); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 29–41 (1993) (characterizing the speech–
action distinction as legalistic); Susan J. Brison, Speech, Harm, and the Mind-Body Problem in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 4 L. THEORY 39, 56–61 (1998) (challenging the distinction between the verbal and
the physical); Mary Ellen Gale, Reimagining the First Amendment: Racist Speech and Equal Liberty,
65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 119, 149 (1991) (questioning the distinctions between speech and action and speech and
conduct); Alon Harel, Hate Speech and Comprehensive Forms of Life, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF
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distinction lying at the foundation of the idea of rationality, and, indeed, of
what it is to be human.7 Yet these debates have taken place in such a narrow
(and too often tendentious) context that they have avoided confronting the
most important foundational issues about freedom of speech. In fact, it is not
uncommon for the defenders of a speech–action distinction to take the
existence of a free speech principle as a given and thus as the premise for the
necessity of accepting the distinction.8 As a matter of positive law or political
rhetoric such a strategy may well be defensible, but for engaging in a deeper
exploration of the foundations of the very idea of free speech it is plainly
unacceptable. In some contexts examining with an open mind whether a free
speech principle is itself sound is an important task,9 and for that task we
cannot simply assume the conclusion of the inquiry. Rather, when we inquire
HATE SPEECH: RETHINKING REGULATION AND RESPONSES 306, 308–10 (Michael Herz & Peter Molnar eds.,
2012) (same). Stanley Fish also questions the distinction, but, given his skeptical stance about the ontology of
distinctions in general, it is difficult to know what to make of his claims about the distinction between speech
and action. STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO 106
(1994) (noting the “general difficulty of separating speech from action”).
7 See, e.g., Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 927, 970–85 (2001)
(arguing that the speech–action distinction plays a “central role in the First Amendment”); Nadine Strossen,
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 492, 494, 532–33, 541–44
(objecting to the “abrogation of the traditional distinctions between speech and conduct”); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution and Free Speech, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 442, 444 (1995) (responding to
attacks on the distinction between speech and conduct); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, 48 SMU L.
REV. 203, 206, 209–10 (1994) (same).
8 See, e.g., Charles W. Collier, Hate Speech and the Mind-Body Problem: A Critique of Postmodern
Censorship Theory, 7 L. THEORY 203, 204 & n.7 (2001) (assuming that there is a “constitutionally significant
difference between speech and . . . action”); Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Speech Clause and the Limits of
Neutrality, 51 ALB. L. REV. 19, 23 (1986) (noting that much of First Amendment doctrine is “predicated on the
speech/action distinction”).
9 Such contexts would include not only philosophical inquiry for its own sake, but also institutional and
constitutional design in domains in which free speech principles are not yet accepted. One example would be
countries with rudimentary free speech protection, and as to which foundational questions might thus be asked
about how much free speech, if any, should be permitted. Another would be non-governmental settings
(corporations and private colleges and universities, for example) in which free speech is considered in the
context of institutional design decisions about who should be allowed or encouraged to say what, even apart
from questions of positive law. And of course the groundings of the idea of free speech are plainly relevant to
questions arising in the interpretation of the First Amendment itself, as is apparent both from the fact that
much of existing free speech theory has been developed in the context of the First Amendment and from the
frequency with which the Supreme Court makes reference to foundational principles in deciding First
Amendment cases. E.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547–50 (2012) (relying on the
foundational premise that truth is not to be authoritatively determined by government); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 24–26 (1971) (basing decision on self-expression rationale for the First Amendment); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564–65 (1969) (stressing freedom of belief and freedom of thought); VINCENT BLASI,
IDEAS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT vii-viii (2d ed. 2012); PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS
8–9 (2013); ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 15–16
(1995); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 2–6 (1990).
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into whether there can be a sound free speech principle at all, we must subject
to critical analysis just what it means to draw a distinction between speech and
action, whether the distinction can actually be drawn, and whether the
distinction, even if it can be drawn, can provide the basis for a principle of
freedom of speech.
Thus, unburdened by any assumptions from existing positive law or
political history—including but not limited to the law and history of the First
Amendment—I examine here whether the kind of distinction between speech
and action that is necessary to any principle of free speech can in fact be
sustained. Much of the focus will be on issues of autonomy and freedom of
thought, and even more particularly on arguments grounded in respect for the
decision-making capacities of autonomous agents whose volitional decisions
are often thought to be a necessary mediating step between speech and harmful
action. But my goal is broader than that, for in questioning the viability of a
speech–action distinction in this context I hope to raise questions about the
speech–action distinction in other free speech contexts as well, and thus
ultimately about the deep soundness of any free speech principle at all.
I. ON THE STRUCTURE OF A FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLE
Although my inquiry is pre-constitutional and pre-doctrinal, the structure of
American constitutional doctrine illuminates the basic idea and the principal
problem. And according to that doctrine, government regulation of most of the
vast universe of human behavior need only satisfy the minimal scrutiny of the
rational basis test.10 We can call this the “baseline rule,” in the sense of it being
the default standard applicable to all governmental action. In practice, the
American baseline rule is a test of virtually no stringency,11 although one can
10

See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730–32 (1963) (holding that the wisdom of a law
restricting the practice of debt adjustment to lawyers was for the legislature and not for the courts to decide);
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–90 (1955) (upholding on rational basis grounds
the requirement that opticians could not fit eyeglasses without receiving a prescription from an optometrist or
ophthalmologist); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391, 398 (1937) (holding that regulation for
purposes of health, safety, morals, and welfare satisfied requirements of due process as long as it bore a
“reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and [was] neither arbitrary nor discriminatory” (quoting
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934))); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (applying
reasonableness test to regulation of business); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152–53 (1938) (announcing that “rational basis” is the standard to be employed in evaluating the
constitutionality of social and economic regulation).
11 See also N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 594 (1979) (concluding that courts applying
rationality review should not interfere with policy decisions “[n]o matter how unwise” they may be); John F.
Manning, The Necessary and Proper Clause and Its Legal Antecedents, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1349, 1349 (2012)
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imagine tests more stringent than the existing rational basis test that would still
operate in this baseline fashion.12 But under the baseline rule that actually
exists, the government may, as long as it meets extremely minimal standards of
rationality, regulate most aspects of personal13 or business14 behavior. And
thus, continuing to adhere to the preliminary terminology noted above, we can
say that existing doctrine establishes that the government may regulate action
subject only to the negligible scrutiny of the rational basis standard.
When the state seeks to regulate speech, however, it must show something
more. We might characterize this “something more” as a “compelling
interest,”15 or instead employ a different formulation of the exceptionally
heavy burden on the state to justify its regulation,16 but the basic idea of
(describing rationality review as “very forgiving”); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1713 (1984) (concluding that rationality review almost always results in validation);
Shoshana Zimmerman, Pushing the Boundaries?: Equal Protection, Rational Basis, and Rational Decision
Making by District Courts in Cases Challenging Legislative Classifications on the Basis of Sexual Orientation,
21 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 727, 733 (2012) (same). See generally Scott H. Bice, Rationality Analysis in
Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1980).
12 And thus the same analytic point applies even if, as is occasionally the case, rational basis review has
(or is argued to have) slightly more “bite.” See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 442 (1982)
(concluding the rationality review requires “something more than the exercise of a strained imagination”);
U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that rationality review
should require more than simply a “conceivable” or “plausible” basis); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 535–38 (1973) (invalidating food stamp qualification criterion on rational basis grounds).
13 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997) (rejecting right to assisted suicide on rational
basis grounds); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 248 (1976) (upholding rationality and thus constitutionality
of personal appearance regulation for police officers). At one time the rational basis standard applied to sexual
conduct, but no longer. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, but not
specifying the standard of review); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (finding a moral basis for a
law sufficient to satisfy the rationality standard).
14 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
15 Although commonly associated with equal protection or due process, the compelling interest
formulation has occasionally surfaced in First Amendment doctrine. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
756–57 (1982) (recognizing “compelling” interest, even as against First Amendment concerns, in protecting
the well-being of minors); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (“compelling”); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (“The fact of equal application does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of
justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes . . . .”); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“It is to say that courts must subject [restrictions] to the most rigid
scrutiny.”).
16 It is more than plausible to characterize the clear and present danger principle in this way, given that
normally the state may, if constrained only by the rational basis standard, deal with dangers that are neither
clear nor present. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Much the same can be said about the
existing crystallization of the clear and present danger standard in Brandenburg v. Ohio. 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969) (holding that advocacy of illegal action may be prohibited if it is directed to producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to produce that result). Brandenburg uses the standards of imminence and
likelihood to embody its stringent protection of speech, but Brandenburg’s implicit assumption is that, when
dealing with non-speech behavior, the state may address problems that are neither “imminent” nor even
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requiring much more of a showing of necessity than is required by the rational
basis standard is the same. Indeed, even when the heightened burden of
justification embodies a degree of scrutiny less stringent than the compelling
interest test, as for example with the so-called intermediate scrutiny applied to
commercial speech,17 the basic structure remains the same, for the fact that the
object of regulation18 is “speech,” again to put it loosely and preliminarily, is
what causes the regulation to be measured against a standard at least somewhat
more stringent than that of mere rationality.19 For present purposes the size of
the gap between rational basis scrutiny of “action” and heightened scrutiny of
“speech” can be set aside, but the very idea of there being a right to free speech
presupposes at least some gap.20 Without the gap between free speech scrutiny
and the scrutiny of some larger or other category, free speech would be merely
an instance of some larger category, and it would be a conceptual error to think
that there was a right to free speech in any meaningful sense.21
Implicit in the foregoing analysis and conclusion is a conception of rights
as entities or principles that raise the standard of justification for restriction of
the activities covered by the right above what it would otherwise be under
some baseline standard of justification. For example, in the United States the
justification for regulating the activity of operating a pushcart need only satisfy

“likely.” Frederick Schauer, Is it Better to Be Safe than Sorry?: Free Speech and the Precautionary Principle,
36 PEPP. L. REV. 301, 307 (2009). More general examinations of the strength of the Brandenburg standard
include, notably, Hans A. Linde, “Clear and Present Danger” Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg
Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1185 (1970); Frank R. Strong, Fifty Years of “Clear and Present Danger”:
From Schenck to Brandenburg—And Beyond, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 52.
17 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (setting out
the standard applicable to commercial advertising). The Central Hudson test remains the applicable standard
today. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667–68 (2011); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525, 553–55 (2001).
18 Or, for that matter, the goal of the regulation, as would be the case under the so-called O’Brien
analysis, according to which heightened First Amendment scrutiny is triggered not by the nature of the activity
regulated but instead by the nature of the state’s interest in regulating. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
376–77 (1968); see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 792 (2d ed. 1988); John Hart Ely,
Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1496–501 (1975). The roles of government purpose and motive in First Amendment
adjudication are analyzed comprehensively in Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996), and Jed Rubenfeld, The
First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 793–95 (2001).
19 See supra note 16.
20 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (observing that First Amendment
doctrine rests on “vital distinctions between words and deeds” and between “ideas and conduct”).
21 On the conditions necessary to conceive of the right to free speech (or any other right) as a distinct or
independent right, see Frederick Schauer, Free Speech on Tuesdays, 34 L. & PHIL. 119 (2015).
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the rational basis baseline standard.22 According to the conception of rights
offered here, therefore, we can say that there is no constitutional right to
operate a pushcart.23 But if the justification for regulating pushcarts were
required to be different from and higher than the standard for regulating
everything else, we could then conclude that there was a right to operate a
pushcart. And so too with speech. Because the standard for regulating speech,
unlike the standard for regulating pushcarts, is indeed higher than the baseline
now associated with rational basis scrutiny, there exists a constitutional right to
speak in a way that there is not, as a matter of existing constitutional doctrine,
a right to operate a pushcart.24
The structure of American constitutional doctrine can thus illuminate this
conception of just what it is for a right to exist, but this conception of rights is
by no means limited to the United States, or even to the rights created by
positive law at all. Consequently, even outside the domain of American
constitutional law, the structure of the putative right to freedom of speech is
the same. As a pre-constitutional or extra-constitutional question of moral or
political philosophy, for example, the idea of a right to free speech—or a free
speech principle—similarly rests on the existence of a difference between what
happens when the right or principle applies and when it does not. Indeed, even
if, contra Ronald Dworkin,25 there is a general right to liberty,26 it is still the
case that when we speak of other and more specific rights and liberties we are
not simply listing the instantiations of the general right. Rather, when we refer
to a right to free speech we are designating something structurally different
from, and stronger than, the myriad forms of behavior that would be subsumed
by a right to liberty simpliciter. And because that differential strength
manifests itself primarily in the way in which the right to free speech
encompasses behavior whose arguable negative consequences would otherwise
justify intervention or restriction even under a general right to liberty,27 the
22

New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303–05 (1976).
See, e.g., id. at 305.
24 This approach to rights appears to be implicit in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 266–
67 (1977) (finding the idea of a general right to liberty “absurd”). The argument for such a right to liberty,
developed as an objection to Dworkin, is set out in Douglas N. Husak, Ronald Dworkin and the Right to
Liberty, 90 ETHICS 123 (1979) (“[T]here is no reason to believe that the right to liberty cannot conflict with the
right to equality.”).
25 See DWORKIN, supra note 24.
26 See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 4 (rev.
ed. 2014); RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 14–15 (2d ed.
2014) (arguing for a natural rights presumption of liberty).
27 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
23
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structure of a right to free speech necessarily presupposes something different
between what is encompassed by the right and what is encompassed by any
general right to liberty we may happen to possess. Accordingly, if we
designate that category of activities encompassed by liberty in general as
“action,” and the category of activities covered by the putative right to free
speech as “speech,” then one way of understanding the distinction between
speech and action is as the linchpin of the very right to free speech in the first
place.
II. A FALSE START WITH A REVEALING PREMISE
Among the first attempts to grapple with the distinction between speech
and action was one that was also, and notoriously so, among the least
successful. In Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,28 and then in
The System of Freedom of Expression,29 Thomas Emerson attempted to work
out a system of absolute but bounded speech—a principle of free speech
structured such that it covered only a small portion of the universe of
communicative or expressive activity but which granted absolute protection to
that which it covered.30 Although everything that counted as “expression”
should be absolutely protected, Emerson argued, the protection of the First
Amendment should not be understood to extend to those acts, some of which
happen to be verbal or linguistic or even communicative, which were not
expression but instead were to be considered “action” or “conduct.”31
Accordingly, insisted Emerson, and paralleling Justice Douglas’s idea that
“speech brigaded with action” was not covered by Douglas’s conception of an
absolute First Amendment,32 most criminal solicitation,33 some incitement,34
28

Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 914–15

(1963).
29

THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–20 (1970).
Id. On the distinction between what the First Amendment covers and the degree of protection it offers
to what it does cover, see Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769–77 (2004). Although the Supreme
Court has often conflated questions of coverage and questions about the degree of protection, it has more
recently appeared to recognize the distinction and its importance. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460,
468, 470 (2010) (announcing a presumption against creating new categories of uncovered speech); see also
Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733–35 (2011) (same, but using the word “protection” to
designate coverage).
31 EMERSON, supra note 29, at 8–9, 17–18.
32 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 398–99 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (“There comes a time, of course, when speech and action are so closely brigaded that
they are really one.”); see also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 768 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“A
command is a speech brigaded with action . . . .”); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas,
30
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some picketing,35 some commercial advertising,36 and some espionage,37
among others, were “action” and not “conduct,” thus being entitled to no
protection under the First Amendment, whereas most forms of advocacy,38
most varieties of protest,39 and all literature,40 for example, were primarily
“expression” and thus entitled to full (absolute) protection.
As was quickly obvious to his critics,41 Emerson’s distinction was
question-begging in the extreme. Rather than employing some sort of
distinction between the properties of expression and the properties of action as
an analytic device to determine which behaviors were encompassed by the
First Amendment and which were not, Emerson drew the distinction between
expression and action on grounds that appeared, at best, obscure, and then
proceeded to apply the label “expression” to those behaviors he found
protected42 and the labels “action” or “conduct” to those he found unprotected,
all the while saying little about the actual factors that would distinguish the one
from the other.43
J., dissenting) (“Speech is closely brigaded with action when it triggers a fight, as shouting ‘fire’ in a crowded
theater triggers a riot.” (citation omitted)).
33 EMERSON, supra note 29, at 403–05.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 356–59, 444–47.
36 Id. at 414–17.
37 Id. at 58–59.
38 Id. at 124–26.
39 Id. at 356–59.
40 Id. at 3, 495.
41 See TRIBE, supra note 18, at 789 & n.28 (criticizing the adoption of “an artificial dichotomy between
(protected) speech-related conduct in which ‘expression’ predominates and (unprotected) conduct in which
‘action’ is dominant”); Ely, supra note 18, at 1494–96, 1495 n.53 (“I simply do not think this distinction can
be made to work.”); Louis Henkin, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 77–80 (1968)
(criticizing the distinction between speech and conduct). For slightly more recent expressions of the same
concern, see Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 576 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(questioning the distinction between speech and conduct by observing that all laws restrict conduct);
Rubenfeld, supra note 18, at 783–84 (2001) (noting that speech is conduct and that many non-speech actions
have a communicative function).
42 Because Emerson defined the coverage of the First Amendment in a way that made the degree of
protection absolute for all covered speech, he forced issues into the decision about coverage—issues that for
others would sometimes be about coverage and sometimes about the degree of protection to be given to certain
forms of covered speech. EMERSON, supra note 29. On the importance of keeping the questions separate, see
KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 5 (1989) (describing as “absurd” the
attempt to conflate coverage and protection).
43 See Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV.
267, 285 (1991) (noting that the distinction between speech and action is what we say to mark a distinction
drawn on other grounds). Indeed, the elusive nature of the distinction between speech and conduct facilitates
labeling (or perceiving) an act as one or the other depending on the outcome preferences of the labeler. See
Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction,
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Although Emerson’s distinction was thus employed more to label outcomes
than to generate or justify them, it was nevertheless premised on the sound idea
that the First Amendment could make sense only if there were some distinction
between speech and action, and only if that distinction related in a meaningful
way to the point of the First Amendment.44 And thus if we examine Emerson’s
own views about the point of what he called the distinction between expression
and conduct, we observe two things. First, and of lesser importance to the
analysis here, is Emerson’s catalog of positive justifications for a principle of
freedom of expression, a catalog that included the conventional appeals to the
search for truth, to the role of discourse in democratic governance, and to the
virtues of individual self-expression,45 as well as to the less conventional (at
the time) idea that various political, sociological, and psychological factors,
what Emerson called the “dynamics” of the limitation,46 made speech
especially vulnerable to restriction. Second, and more importantly, Emerson
appeared to recognize that the positive values of searching for truth, facilitating
democratic governance, and fostering self-expression could also be served by
non-expressive (as Emerson understood it) conduct.47 Moreover, Emerson
might even be charitably interpreted to have acknowledged that even the
regulation of conduct might be plagued by the same pathologies that affected
the regulation of expression.48 As a result, he understood that it was both
difficult yet necessary to offer a distinction between expression and conduct, a
distinction implicit in the idea of freedom of speech and thus in the First
Amendment itself.
To meet this challenge, Emerson relied on the conclusion that “expression
is normally conceived as doing less injury to other social goals than action. It
generally has less immediate consequences, is less irremediable in its
impact.”49 To oversimplify, Emerson constructed much of his view about the
importance of the distinction between expression (speech) and conduct (action)

64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 854, 859, 861–62, 896, 900 (2012) (demonstrating experimentally that the phenomenon
of motivated reasoning influences subjects’ determination whether an act is speech or conduct).
44 See SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 3–14; Schauer, supra note 21.
45 Emerson, supra note 28, at 878–79.
46 EMERSON, supra note 29, at 9–11; Emerson, supra note 28, at 887–93.
47 Thus, Emerson acknowledged that the distinction between expression and action may not always be
“clear,” may at times be “obscure,” and may seem at times “artificial.” EMERSON, supra note 29, at 18.
48 Id.
49 EMERSON, supra note 29, at 9.
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on the premise that expression, compared to conduct, was normally more selfregarding50 and therefore less harmful.51
Emerson’s reliance on what is “normally” the case makes clear that it is
unfair to accuse him of making the implausible claim that speech is always or
necessarily more self-regarding than action. Rather, Emerson argued that on
average, or in the aggregate, the category of speech, qua category, was less
other-regarding than the category of action,52 and accordingly that the category
of speech could be differentially protected relative to the category of action,
even assuming equal positive benefits from the two categories, with less
detrimental effect on society’s ability to deal with the negative consequences
caused by both speech and action. By assuming that the category of speech is
less harmful than the category of action,53 Emerson could argue that protecting
speech but not action would have only minimal effect on the state’s ability to
regulate harmful activities.
Not only did Emerson acknowledge that these relative determinations of
other-regardingness or harm-producing capacities were based on the
tendencies of categories rather than truths about every case, but he also made
clear that in shifting from the term “speech” to that of “expression” he was not
advocating that the principle of freedom of speech could or should be
expanded to include the full range of behavior that might be considered self-

50 The philosophers’ traditional distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding acts is not
congruent with the distinction between harmless and harmful acts, because an act can be other-regarding and
beneficial, and an act can be self-regarding and harmful to the actor. See Jovan Babić, Self-Regarding/OtherRegarding Acts: Some Remarks, 5 PROLEGOMENA 193, 198–200 (2006); C.L. Ten, Mill on Self-Regarding
Actions, 43 PHIL. 29, 31–32, 34, 37 (1968). Still, other-regardingness is a necessary condition for harm to
someone other than the actor.
51 EMERSON, supra note 29, at 9; Emerson, supra note 28, at 889–90.
52 To the same effect, see Michael D. Bayles, Mid-Level Principles and Justification, in JUSTIFICATION:
NOMOS XXVIII 49, 54 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1986) (arguing that the exercise of
freedom of speech “is less likely to interfere with the exercise of other liberties than is, say, liberty of action”).
Similarly, Martin Redish maintains that “it is almost certainly true in the overwhelming majority of cases that
speech is less immediately dangerous than conduct.” MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS 19 n.48 (1984). Redish also maintains that “the simple reality is that, for the most part,
expression is less acutely harmful [than conduct] either to other individuals or to society.” Martin H. Redish,
Fear, Loathing, and the First Amendment: Optimistic Skepticism and the Theory of Free Expression, 76 OHIO
ST. L.J. 691 (700) (2015); see also FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, “SPEECH ACTS” AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 85
(1993) (understanding speech as a largely harmless activity). And, perhaps most prominently, Ronald
Dworkin, especially in DWORKIN, supra note 24, at 200–03 (using freedom of speech as an exemplar of a
broadly conceived personal liberty based on a right to equal concern and respect).
53 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.

SCHAUER GALLEYSPROOFS2

438

1/14/2016 2:26 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:427

expressive.54 Rather, Emerson’s terminological shift was designed to make
clear that the freedom of speech encompassed forms of communicative
behavior that would not count as “speech” according to the ordinary language
meaning of that term—flag burning (or flag waving), painting, sculpture,
music, armband-wearing, uniform-wearing, picketing, and parading, for
example, to say nothing of writing and printing—and also to emphasize that
there were forms of language—“speech” in the ordinary language sense—that
did not fall under his heading of expression. Behind Emerson’s distinction was
the belief that some forms of human communication operate in a way that is
more reflective than reflexive, as when I actually think about your argument
rather than when I unthinkingly react to your surprising me by shouting “Boo!”
For Emerson, the difference between the reflective and the reflexive was the
keystone of distinguishing speech from action, and thus the foundation for the
differential protection of speech that lies at the heart of the First Amendment.55
Emerson’s ultimately question-begging approach nonetheless contained
two important (although not necessarily sound) ideas. First, the category of
speech is better understood as the category of communication.56 Thus, what we
may at times understand as a distinction between speech and action is better
conceived as a distinction between communicative and non-communicative
conduct.57 And, second, the category of communication, according to
Emerson, is, as a category, less likely to produce negative consequences than
the category of non-communicative conduct.58 It is these two ideas—that
communication as a category is different from non-communicative conduct in
a free-speech-relevant way, and that communication as a category is less
harmful than non-communicative conduct—to which we must now turn.

54 Compare C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989), with C. Edwin Baker,
Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 996, 1019 (1978), which both go
pretty far in exactly this direction. For an iconic critique of this move, see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 25 (1971) (observing that theories of this variety “do not
distinguish speech from any other human activity”).
55 See EMERSON, supra note 29, at 500 (describing the “shock effect” of some of the communications he
labeled as “action”).
56 See LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 7–8 (2005) (equating
freedom of speech with freedom of communication).
57 Id. at 8.
58 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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III. IS THINKING DIFFERENT FROM DOING?
Emerson’s terminological shift from “speech” to “expression” reveals his
belief that the distinction between communication and action arises out of a
fundamental and natural distinction between thinking and doing. For Emerson,
there is an important distinction between thinking or contemplating or
reflecting on something, on the one hand, and actually taking an action, on the
other. But is the distinction sound, and, even if it is, what does it say, if
anything, about the idea of freedom of speech?
The place to start in examining the question is with the seemingly
straightforward difference between a person’s contemplation of engaging in
some action and her actually engaging in it, with free speech protecting only
the former and not the latter. Thus, what might make communication
relevantly different from conduct, different in a way that connects with the
First Amendment’s ideas and ideals, is the way in which communication about
some action—whether it is to describe, commend, or condemn it—is
conceptually distinct from the action itself. If I urge you to shoot someone, that
act is different from my shooting someone, and it is different from you
shooting someone. And what might make this undeniable conceptual
separation important is not only the possibility that the communication, even if
advocating action, might not lead to the action advocated, but also that the link
between the communication and the action requires an additional act of
volition on the part of the recipient of the communication.59 If Clarence
Brandenburg’s advocacy of acts of “revengeance” against African Americans
and Jews60 had actually inspired, produced, or caused such an act of
revengeance, an intentional decision by the person committing the act would
also have been necessary.
That a volitional act on the part of the recipient of a communication is
necessary to convert a communication into an action reveals the importance of
the role that autonomy plays in the development of a free-speech-relevant
distinction between speech and action.61 Because the gap between receiving a
59 This is most obvious with respect to advocacy, but also is applicable to praising and blaming an action,
because there is still a non-necessary connection between the commendation or condemnation on the part of a
communicator and the recipient of the communication adopting some attitude towards the action that is
commended or condemned.
60 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446–47 (1969). Mr. Brandenburg did not use the word “African
Americans.” Id.
61 See Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, supra note 3, at 206–07, 216–17; David A. Strauss,
Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 353–60 (1991) (defending the

SCHAUER GALLEYSPROOFS2

440

1/14/2016 2:26 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:427

communication pertinent to action and the action itself is filled by a volitional
act on the part of the recipient, the recipient’s autonomy of action is
accordingly a necessary condition for action. Advocacy, for example, cannot
produce action without conscious intervention by the recipient of the
communication. And thus, so it is said,62 any attempt on the part of
government (or, for that matter, anyone else) to impede the flow of
communication prerequisite to this decision would amount to a lack of respect
for the recipient’s autonomy. If we are not able to decide for ourselves what to
do, including deciding to do or not do things for which the state will punish us
if we do them, then we have lost, so the argument goes, an irreducible element
of what it is to be human. And since it would not be plausible to take the value
of autonomy as generating or justifying a total right (as a Hohfeldian
privilege,63 or liberty64) to liberty—the right simply to do whatever one
wishes—the right that autonomy generates is typically restricted to the inputs
to autonomous decision-making as opposed to the outputs.65 Freedom of
communication, therefore, is said to be the freedom of a decision-maker to
unimpeded access to those arguments and information necessary for her to
make the best decision she can about what actually to do. Under this account,
freedom of speech is in the final analysis about freedom of decision, and thus
necessarily about freedom of thought.
Yet although freedom of thought certainly seems like a good thing, we
need to further sharpen the inquiry. So let us begin by dividing a person’s
thoughts into four categories. First are thoughts as to which rightness or
wrongness is beside the point, such as thinking that vanilla ice cream is better
than chocolate, or thinking about any of the other topics that we tend to
designate as tastes. Second are thoughts that are simply correct, such as the
thoughts that skin color is irrelevant to moral worth, or that Louisville is not

“persuasion principle” by reference to the importance of the autonomy of the hearer). But see Scanlon,
Comment on Baker’s Autonomy, supra note 3, at 319–20 (questioning the value of focusing on autonomy).
62 Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, supra note 3, at 531; Strauss, supra
note 61; see also Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism: Some Second Thoughts, in PATERNALISM 105, 106–07 (Rolf
Sartorius ed., 1983) (arguing that autonomy is denied when there is manipulation of someone’s “information
set”); RICHARD MOON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 21 (2000) (arguing
that full autonomy can only “emerge in the social realm”).
63 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
23 YALE L.J. 16, 32 (1913).
64 On the use of the word “liberty” as a synonym for what Hohfeld called a “privilege,” see Leif Wenar,
Rights, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/ (last updated July 2, 2011).
65 See ROGER A. SHINER, FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION 167–68, 234–38 (2003) (analyzing
differences between speaker-focused and hearer-focused autonomy).
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the capital of Kentucky. Third are thoughts that are actually wrong but
generally harmlessly so, as with the beliefs of astrology or the beliefs in the
existence of Santa Claus or the Easter Bunny. And fourth are those thoughts
that are both wrong and harmful, the category about which much more now
needs to be said.
We know, of course, that much of the history of the development of
freedom of thought as an idea has stemmed from the frequency with which
people, and especially people in power, placed in the fourth category thoughts
that more appropriately belonged to the first, second, or third. We know that
those in power attempted to prohibit people from denying (or, occasionally,
affirming) that Catholicism represented the One True Faith;66 tried to prohibit
Copernicus and Galileo from thinking that the Earth revolved around the
Sun;67 and enacted obscenity laws in an effort to prevent people from thinking
about extra-marital sex and teenage boys from thinking about sex at all.68 Yet
although such mistakes have been frequent throughout history, their frequency
is a contingent empirical fact—that is, their frequency and consequences will
vary with time, place, and culture. Moreover, the frequency of mistakes of this
kind is still not inconsistent with the existence of the fourth category of
genuinely harmful thoughts. Perhaps the frequency of mistakes, especially by
the state, in distinguishing the fourth category from the other three should lead
to a principle disempowering the state from drawing the distinction between
harmful and harmless speech at all, but that would be a possible outcome of the
analysis rather than a premise.69 When Justice Powell, in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,70 announced that “under the First Amendment there is no such

66 See THOMAS MORE’S TRIAL BY JURY: A PROCEDURAL AND LEGAL REVIEW WITH A COLLECTION OF
DOCUMENTS (Henry A. Kelly, Louis W. Karlin & Gerard B. Wegener eds., 2011) (1980); Andrew P. Roach &
Maja Angelovska-Panova, Punishment of Heretics: Comparisons and Contrasts Between Western and Eastern
Christianity in the Middle Ages, 47 J. HIST. 145, 154 (2012).
67 See THE TRIAL OF GALILEO: 1612–1633, at 1–2 (Thomas F. Mayer ed., 2012).
68 See ALEC CRAIG, SUPPRESSED BOOKS: A HISTORY OF THE CONCEPTION OF LITERARY OBSCENITY
40–53 (1963); NOEL PERRIN, DR. BOWDLER’S LEGACY: A HISTORY OF EXPURGATED BOOKS IN ENGLAND AND
AMERICA 163–70 (1969); C.H. ROLPH, BOOKS IN THE DOCK 40–61 (1969).
69 Moreover, the existence of dangerous mistakes in branding harmless (or beneficial) speech as harmful
is only one dimension of a more complex decision-theoretic calculus. Although there are negative
consequences to designating harmless or beneficial speech as harmful, so too will there be negative
consequences in designating harmful speech as harmless. The full analysis would therefore have to weigh the
expected (in the expected value sense of the product of the likelihood of the error multiplied by its
consequences) costs of erroneously designating harmless speech as harmful against the expected costs of
erroneously designating harmful speech as harmless.
70 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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thing as a false idea,”71 he was making a (somewhat exaggerated) descriptive
claim about First Amendment doctrine, and is thus most charitably understood
not as asserting the implausible conceptual or meta-ethical claim that ideas do
not have truth value, or that the truth-value of some ideas, even moral ones,72
cannot be negative. Rather, Justice Powell is best understood as insisting only
that the principles of First Amendment doctrine do not authorize governmental
inquiry into the truth of ideas, even ideas that are plainly false.
So let us then turn to the fourth category—the category we can call harmful
thoughts.73 To put the matter directly, we want to ask whether there can be
harmful thoughts, and not just whether under the First Amendment there can
be harmful thoughts. Consider as an example, an example inspired by United
States v. Stevens,74 the thought that it is permissible and maybe even positively
desirable for animals to be tortured for the (non-nutritional) gratification of
humans. And then let us assume what I hope that most of us would accept—
although obviously not all of us, or else Stevens would not even have arisen—
that the content of the idea is not just different, and not merely a matter of
taste, but simply wrong. We should hold off for a moment considering the
objection that the thought will not necessarily lead to actual torture, for this is
what we are about to address. But first assume simply that the activity—
torturing animals for human gratification—that the thought is about is an
activity that is both wrong and harmful.
Initially, we can posit that people who think that animals ought to be
tortured are more likely to torture animals than people who do not have that
thought. And as so put, the claim seems plainly true, even as we recognize that
the percentages may be low. That is, the claim—that people who have the
thought that animals ought to be tortured are more likely to torture animals
than people who do not have the thought—is a claim that is consistent with
many or most people who have the thought not actually committing the act.
But as a matter of conditional probability, or relevance in the evidentiary
sense,75 it would be difficult to deny that the probability of a person torturing
71

Id. at 339.
To be clear, claims about inherent racial superiority or the evil of homosexuality, for example, are
erroneous moral claims, but still moral claims.
73 Cf. MEIR DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL THOUGHTS: ESSAYS ON LAW, SELF, AND MORALITY (2002).
74 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (invalidating on First Amendment grounds a federal law prohibiting the sale and
distribution of images of animal cruelty).
75 Thus, Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence makes a piece of evidence relevant if it “has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence and the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.” FED. R. EVID. 401.
72
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animals is higher if the person has the thought that torturing animals is a good
thing than if the same person does not have that thought. Relatedly, for most
animal torturers having the thought that it would be good (or desirable, or
necessary, or something of that sort) to torture this animal at this time would be
a necessary condition for their engaging in the act of torture.76 This is
decidedly not to say that having the thought is a sufficient condition for a
person engaging in the act. It is only to say that in the normal case having the
thought is a necessary condition, in addition to it being a probabilistic indicator
of undetermined size of the likelihood of animal torture.
None of this, of course, is inconsistent with there being many people (or
even most people) who think that torturing animals is a good thing but who
still do not torture them. Yet it seems a pretty safe empirical bet that people
who do have the thought that torturing animals is a good thing are statistically
more likely to torture animals than people who do not have that thought.
Now let us suppose that we as a society believe, and as our laws against
animal cruelty reflect, that torturing animals is wrong. And if we believe that
torturing animals is wrong, then we ought to believe that the thought that
torturing animals is good should be placed in the fourth category—the category
of harmful thoughts. The content of the thought is wrong, the behavior that the
thought is about is harmful, and the fact that people having the thought is
statistically likely to increase the incidence of the harmful behavior itself77—
more animals are going to wind up being tortured when more people have the
thought that torturing them is a good thing than when fewer people have that
thought. The thought is a harmful thought, therefore, not simply because of its
content, but because having a thought of this content will increase the
likelihood of the harmful behavior. The thought that torturing animals is good
therefore properly belongs in the fourth category of thoughts that are both
wrong and harmful.
The task before us is then to consider how we as a people and as a
collective political institution should react to people who have harmful
thoughts. We could (and do) respect the autonomy and their freedom to think
as they wish by doing nothing—even if in an increasingly likely technological
76 I say “most” only in order to keep open the logical but empirically unlikely possibility of an instinctive
or reactive act of animal torture.
77 Note that “statistically likely to increase the probability” is not the same as the behavior being likely to
occur. Sending text messages while operating an automobile is statistically likely to increase the probability of
accidents even though most driver texting does not produce accidents.
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world we could.78 After all, having the thought is not itself harmful, and we are
now calling it a harmful thought only because the thought, harmless in itself,
increases the likelihood of harmful action.
But if the possessor of harmful thoughts ought to be allowed to indulge
those thoughts—to keep having them, and not to be punished for having
them—because his autonomy of thinking might not (and probably will not)
produce a harmful action, then, similarly, how are we to think about the full
range of actions preparatory to, and probabilistically indicative of, the
commission of a crime. As we know, many of these preparatory actions are
designated as independent crimes—preparatory offenses.79 Possession of
burglar tools is an independent crime, even though the burglar tools possessor
might not actually burgle anything.80 Similarly, possession of a hand grenade is
a crime although the hand grenade owner may not try to blow anyone up.81
And so too with the assault rifle owner who might not shoot anyone,82 the pit
bull owner who would not allow his pit bulls to go unrestrained,83 and so on.
In cases such as the ones just listed we often criminalize the preparatory act
even though the possessor or preparer in the exercise of his autonomy might
not ultimately go ahead and actually do what it is we are really worried about.
But in most of these cases we nevertheless do not allow respect for an agent’s
putative autonomy to lead us to refrain from restraining conduct (or arguing for
such restraint) that is preparatory to and probabilistically related to intrinsically
harmful actions. And then the question is whether these examples are any
different from the example of the animal-torture thinker who might not
78 This is not an essay in neuroscience, or, more specifically, in what fMRI scans and other techniques of
modern neuroscience now or in the foreseeable future will enable people to find out about what other people
are thinking. On the actual or potential application of these techniques to various legal questions, see MICHAEL
S. PARDO & DENNIS PATTERSON, MINDS, BRAINS, AND LAW: THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND
NEUROSCIENCE (2013). Nevertheless, some of these possibilities, however remote, and however large the
moral issues they raise, make inquiring into the topic of freedom of thought (as opposed to the external
manifestations of that thought) more important now than would have been the case a generation ago.
79 See Dan Bein, Preparatory Offences, 27 ISR. L. REV. 185 (1993); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Inchoate
Crimes at the Prevention/Punishment Divide, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1273, 1282–85 (2011).
80 An example of the common criminalization of possession of burglar tools is N.Y. PENAL LAW §140.35
(McKinney 2010).
81 On the crime of possession of hand grenades, see United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971).
82 See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-94 (West 2012). Of course the Second Amendment might be relevant here
after District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S.
742, 791 (2010), but exploring that question, including the interesting parallels here between the First and the
Second Amendments, would take us too far afield.
83 On pit bull prohibitions, see Am. Dog Owners Ass’n v. City of Yakima, 777 P.2d 1046 (Wash. 1989)
(en banc).
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actually go ahead and torture animals. If we can prosecute the burglar tools
owner without a burglary actually taking place, can we prosecute the
animal-torture thinker without animal torture actual taking place?
Indeed, the basic point extends beyond the narrow domain of preparatory
offenses, because the universe of prohibitions broader than the evil against
which they are directed is vast. In the service of the goal of reducing
automobile accidents we require people to drive below a designated speed,
even if in the exercise of their autonomy they might well compensate for the
increased risks coming from higher speeds by driving with greater care. Nor do
we permit people to possess heroin, even though it is (remotely) possible that
they will neither use nor sell it. And in addition, the existence of vicarious
liability in numerous domains again shows that the necessity of a mediating
volitional act in order for the tort or crime to be effectuated is often thought not
to preclude responsibility. That the seller of alcohol,84 the seller of guns,85 the
seller of cigarettes,86 or even the employer of a contract killer87 is under some
circumstances liable in addition to (and, importantly, not instead of, showing
that even the existence of a legally responsible volitional intermediary does not
preclude vicarious liability) the principal shows once again that respect for
autonomy is rarely understood to generate doctrines immunizing anyone other
than the final agent from liability. The entire domain of vicarious liability, as
well as tort liability for foreseeable misuse,88 all reject the notion that the

84 See generally Richard A. Smith, Note, A Comparative Analysis of Dramshop Liability and a Proposal
for Uniform Legislation, 25 J. CORP. L. 553, 558–63 (2000).
85 Vicarious liability for those who sell the guns subsequently used for unlawful purposes is now largely
precluded by the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903), but the issues are still alive. See Neal S. Shechter, Note, After Newtown:
Reconsidering Kelley v. R.G. Industries and the Radical Idea of Product-Category Liability for Manufacturers
of Unreasonably Dangerous Firearms, 102 GEO. L.J. 551, 577–78 (2014).
86 See generally Frank J. Vandall, Reallocating the Costs of Smoking: The Application of Absolute
Liability to Cigarette Manufacturers, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 405, 406 (1991).
87 That the employer or even the aider and abettor of a contract killer is liable for murder is plain. United
States v. Hardwick, 523 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Dorman, 108 Fed. App’x 228, 231 (6th
Cir. 2004). Whether under some circumstances those who provide instructions for contract killing can be liable
in tort, or whether instead such instructions are shielded by the First Amendment, remains a contested issue.
See Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 242–43, 267, 355–56 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a First Amendment
defense for aiders and abettors); Wilson v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1144 (D. Or. 2001)
(same).
88 See, e.g., Osorio v. One World Techs., Inc., 659 F.3d 81 (1st Cir. 2011) (upholding judgment against
manufacturer of a table saw although proper use of the blade guard would have prevented the injury); LeBouef
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 451 F. Supp. 253, 257 (W.D. La. 1978), aff’d, 623 F.2d 985, 988–89 (5th Cir.
1980) (upholding liability for tire manufacturer when tire user’s intentional disregard of normal safety
precautions would have prevented the tire failure that caused the accident).
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existence of an autonomous agent whose autonomous decision causes a harm
will serve to immunize from liability those other agents whose actions might
have contributed to the autonomous agent’s harmful acts.
Although the examples that undercut the argument from autonomy thus
exist even outside the realm of preparatory offenses, let us stay on the safest
ground by considering only the category of harmful preparatory acts. As just
noted, such acts, with little controversy, are routinely and generally both
criminalized and taken to provide the basis for tort liability. It turns out,
therefore, that there is no general existing legal principle immunizing
intrinsically harmless acts from legal sanction if they are probabilistically
related to actual harmful acts. And because we have seen that we can
characterize harmful thoughts in much the same way, the question of how to
conceive of harmful thoughts is importantly similar to the question of how to
conceive of harmful preparatory acts.
Identifying the similarity between harmful thoughts and harmful
preparatory acts enables us to sharpen the inquiry even further. Let us say that
having thought T increases the probability of harm H(1) with a probability of
P(1), and thus that the expected harm—EH(1)—is P(1) x H(1). But the same
structure applies to acts as well, so that we can also say that engaging in action
A (buying or possessing burglar tools, say) increases the probability of harm
H(2) by P(2), and thus that the expected harm—EH(2)—is P(2) x H(2). The
important question, therefore, is whether we should treat EH(1) differently—
less restrictively—from how we would (and do) treat EH(2), when their values
are equivalent, or when EH(1) is greater than EH(2). To put it differently,
should we immunize harm-producing thoughts from restriction more than we
immunize harm-producing actions when the expected harms are the same, or
when the expected harms of the thought are greater than the expected harms of
the action. In other words, should there be a principle of freedom of thought?
The alert reader will have noticed that I have just translated into freedom of
thought terms the same formulation that Scanlon and others89 have used to
characterize a free speech principle. If a principle of freedom of speech just
means that speech enjoys a degree of immunity from government action
greater than that possessed by non-speech action having the same or equivalent
negative consequences, then a principle of freedom of thought must similarly
mean that thoughts have a degree of immunity from government action greater

89

See supra notes 3, 61–62.
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than that enjoyed by non-thought conduct again having the same or equivalent
negative consequences. But if this is what a robust or genuine principle of
freedom of thought must mean, we still must address whether as a normative
matter such a principle ought to be accepted.90
In addressing the question whether there should be a principle immunizing
harmful thoughts in a way that harmful preparatory acts having equivalent
expected harm are not immunized, it is necessary to return to the argument
from autonomy.91 It seems initially obvious that respect for someone’s
autonomy requires that we respect her thought processes.92 But then we must
still ask why we should respect someone’s right (and the existence of a right in
the sense explicated in Part I above is what is now under consideration) to have
a wrong and harmful thought?
One reason for respecting what appear to be harmful thoughts is the
possibility that the possessor of the thought is right, that we (or the state) are
wrong, and that consequently the thought is not in fact harmful. This Millian
perspective—it was John Stuart Mill who most famously connected the liberty
of (expressed) opinion to epistemic fallibilism and thus to the possibility that
the received opinion is mistaken and the suppressed opinion correct93—is
certainly a wise caution before acting on any received belief and before
restricting any action thought harmful.
Although humility is almost always wise, it is not yet apparent that a
principle of humility can generate the differential principle we are seeking. For
although I might be wrong in thinking that that you are wrong in what you are
thinking, I might also be wrong in thinking that you are wrong in what you are
doing. Humility is in general a good thing, yet it is far from clear that there is
reason to believe that my (over)confidence about my assessment of your
thoughts ought to be tempered by a stronger principle of humility than that
which should properly temper my assessment of your actions, especially your
preparatory actions. Yes, I might be wrong, but it is hard to see why that
90 I again bracket the question of the physical inevitability of freedom of thought, in part because the
physical inevitability captured by the concentration camp slogan, “Die Gedanken sind frei,” may in our
modern neuroscientific world no longer be so inevitable. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
91 See supra text accompanying notes 61–65.
92 See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Methodology in Free Speech Theory, 97 VA. L. REV. 549, 554 (2011)
(emphasizing the importance of “control over one’s thoughts”).
93 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Spitz ed., W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1975) (1859). On Mill’s
fallibilism, see Stephen Holmes, John Stuart Mill: Fallibilism, Expertise, and the Politics-Science Analogy, in
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 125, 126–27 (Marcelo Dascal & Ora Gruengard eds., 1989); JOHN SKORUPSKI,
JOHN STUART MILL 8–12 (1989).
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possibility should be any less applicable to my empirical probabilistic
assessments of the consequences of your preparatory or other accessory actions
than it is to my empirical probabilistic assessment of the consequences of your
thoughts.94
Of course we know, as discussed above,95 that thoughts might well not
produce actions. But this rejoinder is unavailing. It is true that thoughts might
not produce actions consistent with those thoughts, but harmless (as stipulated)
actions that are probabilistically causally related to harmful actions might also
not produce those harmful actions. If respect for some agent’s ability to change
her mind before committing an actually harmful act leads to a principle of
moral, constitutional, or legal protection, then it ought logically to lead to a
principle protecting harmless acts just as it protects harmless thoughts. Or, to
be more precise, there remains no reason to reject a principle protecting acts
whose expected harm is no greater than the expected harm of what we have
been calling a harmful thought.
Even more importantly, it is not clear whether the idea of autonomy can do
the work that many theorists appear to be requiring of it.96 Consider, for
example, the 1964 incident involving Kitty Genovese, who was brutally
attacked and murdered while multiple onlookers allegedly did nothing at all.97
Now one (deliberately offensive and tendentious) way of describing the
behavior of the non-intervening onlookers is as respecting the autonomy of the
attacker. But of course this characterization is absurd, and it is absurd precisely
because we take the principle of autonomy to be limited by, or to exclude, an
agent’s autonomous decision to harm others. My freedom to swing my arm
ends at the tip of your nose, as it is said.98 And once we see this, we can
understand that autonomy is in an important way asymmetric. Once we engage
in the discounting commended by the principle of humility, we have no reason
94 See Scanlon, Comment on Baker’s Autonomy and Free Speech, supra note 3, at 322 n.11 (noting with
respect to autonomy that the “same is true of paternalistic legislation restricting behavior other than
expression”).
95 See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
96 On the connection between freedom of thought and autonomy, see especially Shiffrin, supra note 92,
at 554; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Reply to Critics, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 417, 418–26 (2011); and Seana
Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 283 (2011).
97 The accuracy of the standard story, according to which thirty-eight people heard her screams and did
nothing, is the source of some controversy. See KEVIN COOK, KITTY GENOVESE: THE MURDER, THE
BYSTANDER, THE CRIME THAT CHANGED AMERICA (2014).
98 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in Wartime, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 957 (1919) (“Your right
to swing your arms ends just where the other man’s nose begins.”). Chafee may have gotten the line from
Holmes, or it may even have been around for longer.
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to respect a person’s autonomous other-regarding and harm-producing actions,
even as she, presumably (or hopefully) applying the same principle of humility
to discount her own assessment of her own proposed action, preserves her
obligation to do what she thinks best. Just as you have an obligation to do what
you think it is best to do, so too do I have an obligation to try to keep you from
doing so when my assessment is that what you think it is best to do will be
both other-regarding and harm-producing.99
The foregoing argument does not work, of course, for any instance in
which a preparatory thought has a lower expected harm than a preparatory
action. But we have stipulated an equivalence, and with that stipulation in
place the asymmetry of autonomy—your obligation to follow your autonomy
where it leads on the basis of your best judgment that it is for the good does not
entail my obligation to refrain from attempting to limit that autonomy when in
my best judgment your (mistaken) exercise of your (mistaken) best judgment
will produce harm to third parties100—produces the conclusion that a principle
of autonomy cannot generate a distinct principle of freedom of thought. Of
course the stipulation of equivalence may be empirically unsound, and the
class of harmful thoughts (a more plausible way of understanding the issue as
opposed to making these assessments in each individual case) may be a class
less harmful, in the expected harm sense, than the class of harmful preparatory
actions. Accordingly, we need to relax the stipulation of equivalence and take
this possibility seriously. But before doing so, it will be important to shift the
analysis from freedom of thought to freedom of speech.
IV. FROM THOUGHTS TO SPEECH
I have up to now framed the issue in terms of freedom of thought rather
than freedom of speech. And there are two reasons for this: First, freedom of
thought appears to have an even tighter connection to autonomy than does
freedom of speech. What, after all, is more mine than my thoughts? Second,
and partly as a consequence of the first reason, the argument for there being no
principle of freedom of thought appears initially to be even stronger than the
argument for there being no principle of freedom of speech. As a result, if the
99

See Larry Alexander, Can Law Survive the Asymmetry of Authority?, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 463, 468
(2000); Larry Alexander, “With Me, It’s All er Nuthin’”: Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
530, 553 (1999).
100 And if we reject anti-paternalism as a distinct principle, the same argument applies to harms to the
agent herself. For a forceful and recent rejection of anti-paternalism, see SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY:
JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM (2013).
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more difficult argument against a free thought principle is sound, then so too, a
fortiori, will be the less difficult argument against a free speech principle—at
least an autonomy-based or otherwise individualistic argument against a free
speech principle.101
So if we now examine directly the question of free speech, we can run the
same analysis. Initially, we should put aside three different classes of speech,
for reasons that will become apparent. First is speech that by its very utterance
causes injury, to use the Chaplinsky formulation,102 for here the harm from
speech resembles the harm from a punch, a kick, or, perhaps even more
relevantly, a spit.103 Second is the class in which the causal relationship simply
does not exist, as in the case of the often alleged but never proved causal
relationship between non-violent, non-degrading, and non-exploitative
sexually explicit material and sexual violence.104 And the third class is
comprised of those instances in which there may be a causal relationship
between some category of speech and some category of consequences, but
where the consequences are not in fact harmful, as with the nineteenth century
worry that exposure to sexually explicit materials would cause teenage boys to
masturbate more than would otherwise have been the case.105
Having bracketed these three classes, we are left with the task of
examining speech that is not harmful in itself but which is genuinely causally
101

In recent years freedom of thought has been influentially urged as a basis for a principle of free speech.
See Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 233
(1992); Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, supra note 96; Shiffrin, supra note 92, at
554; Shiffrin, Reply to Critics, supra note 96, at 418–26. But as Shiffrin makes clear, these efforts have started
with the premise that free speech exists as an independent principle, but one which remains in need of
justification. See Shiffrin, supra note 92, at 550 (describing her project as one of developing an “ideal theory
of freedom of speech”). That is an important enterprise, but justifying a principle of free speech that is
stipulated (in an argument, or in an item of positive law such as the First Amendment) is different from the
project, which is mine here, of not assuming such a principle at the outset, but, rather, of exploring whether
what others take as their premise can itself be justified. See id.
102 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (describing fighting words as words “which
by their very utterance inflict injury”).
103 Spitting is interesting in this context because whatever harm is produced by being intentionally spat
upon, just like the harm of being slapped in the face, has little to do with pain, and even less to do with a
wound or physical injury. And thus it seems incumbent on defenders of a speech–action distinction to explain
why the plainly communicative and non-physically-harmful act of spitting on another ought to be excluded
from the realm of free-speech-relevant behavior.
104 See Frederick Schauer, Causation Theory and the Causes of Sexual Violence, 1987 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 737, 737–38.
105 See ROLPH, supra note 68, at 53. This worry appears to be at the heart of the case most important in
establishing nineteenth century obscenity doctrine, Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 LRQB 360, at 361, 363 (Eng.),
although the court in that case puts the matter in somewhat less transparent terminology.
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likely to increase the incidence of genuinely harmful actions. And we can
examine this speech in the same way that we have examined freedom of
thought.106 Thus, if we assume equivalent causal contributions to some harmful
consequence by some act of speech and by some act of non-speech action, or if
we simply assume equivalent expected harm, is there any reason to immunize
preparatory speech acts to a greater extent than we immunize preparatory
non-speech conduct? There may be, but, as we have just seen, if there is such a
reason, it is a not a reason that can be derived from conceptions of
autonomy.107 If the principle of autonomy protects neither autonomous
harm-producing actions nor the actions that would increase the likelihood of
subsequent and consequent harm, then there seems no reason, just as in the
case of thoughts whose consequences have the same structure, to treat speech
differently from the way in which we treat action.
At this point it is necessary to return to Emerson. Once we understand that
intrinsically harmless preparatory actions are routinely prohibited when they
are probabilistically related to harmful acts, even though a volitional act is
necessary to link the harmless act to the harmful one,108 the existence of such a
volitional link can no longer constitute a sound basis for distinguishing speech
from action. Rather, the case for speech being relevantly different from action
would have to rest on the determination that the category of speech that is
causally productive of harmful action is, as a category, less efficacious than is
the category of harmless actions that are causally productive of harmful
actions.
Although Emerson and others have simply asserted this to be the case,109 it
turns out that this is a virtually impossible proposition to establish. Once we
understand that the relevant comparison is not between speech and harmful
actions but rather between speech and those actions, not harmful in themselves,
that might produce harmful actions, then the existence of a free speech
principle that would immunize the former but not the latter from control must
rest on this extremely problematic empirical claim. We could of course say that
under circumstances of empirical uncertainty the default rule ought to be
freedom, but we could say this about action as easily as about speech. And thus
the putative default rule would still not provide a sound basis for the distinction
between speech and action or for an autonomy-based principle of freedom of
106
107
108
109

See supra Part III.
See text accompanying notes 59–65.
See supra note 83–88 and accompanying text.
See supra note 50.
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speech. This approach may be effective as a matter of existing positive law, but
as a matter of pre-positive-law analysis we appear to be left with the view that
any autonomy-based or individualistic conception of freedom of speech rests
far more on an unestablished and likely false conclusion about the
harmlessness of speech than is typically recognized.
To be more specific, if the claim that speech is harmless rests on its
inability to be causally related to intrinsically harmful acts, then we have far
too many counter-examples in our experience to be comfortable with this
formulation.110 But if the claim instead rests on the view that any harm that is
(probabilistically) caused by a communicative act requires the mediation of
any additional volitional act on the part of the recipient of the communication,
then accepting this conception of harmlessness would unsettle far more of
existing tort and other non-speech law than we have previously thought. And
with both of these alternatives aside, therefore, what remains is a view of
speech that maintains that speech, as a category, is differentially harmless, a
view that is in need of far more empirical evidence than it has thus far
received. It is of course true that most speech is harmless. But it is also true
that most action is harmless. Recognizing this seemingly obvious but often
ignored fact has led many people to make claims about the categorial or
differential harmlessness of speech111 that may not stand up to close analysis or
empirical testing.
Because it is true both that most speech will not produce harmful action
and that most action will not produce harmful action, the question before us is
not whether a society should permit the regulation of harmless speech. Rather,
it is the question whether the proper line between permissible and
impermissible state intervention is a line between speech and action, or instead,
and seemingly preferably, between causally inert (of harm) behavior, some of
which is speech and some of which is action, and causally efficacious (of
harm) behavior, some of which is speech and some of which is action. Under
the latter principle, some speech now protected under existing First
Amendment doctrine would be regulable, but if applied accurately the
differences between this principle and existing doctrine might well be small.
Under non-ideal conditions the difference might of course be greater, but the
question then is still whether guarding against the consequences of non-ideal

110
111

See, e.g., supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
See supra note 50.
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application should be a strategy limited to speech or rather one of more
pervasive application.
CONCLUSION
The basic idea of this Article is that it is hardly clear that respect for an
agent’s autonomy ought to lead other agents, or the state, to tolerate
autonomous communicative actions that are determined to be likely to cause
harm to third parties any more than they should tolerate autonomous noncommunicative actions whose consequences are equivalent. If the principle of
freedom to engage in autonomous actions is one that is limited to cases of
harm to others, then, at the very least, this limitation has more impact on
standard autonomy views about freedom of speech than has commonly been
appreciated. If there is a reason to protect autonomous speech that does not
apply as well to autonomous action, then, as we have seen, it cannot be a
reason derived from the idea of autonomy itself, and instead needs to be based
on a much greater empirical showing of the differential consequences of
speech and action than has to date been provided.
All of this might be irrelevant to the very existence of a free speech
principle if it turns out that speech, or a subset of speech, or, most accurately, a
subset of communication, has as a category positive attributes not possessed by
the category of non-speech action. And thus even if the harm-producing
capacities of the two categories were equivalent, differential benefit-producing
capacities might still be sufficient to justify a sound free speech principle. And
although dealing with that possibility must remain for another day, the analysis
here may suggest that even that task—and thus the task of distinguishing
speech from action for purposes of explaining, say, the value of speech in the
search for truth112—is considerably more difficult than has traditionally been
assumed.113
In addition, this Article is situated almost entirely within the domain of
individualistic or autonomy-based accounts of freedom of speech rather than
democracy-based accounts. Some of the latter are about the methods of

112 For a collection of the most important works in the “search for truth” or “marketplace of ideas” free
speech tradition, see VINCENT BLASI, IDEAS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 318–689 (2d ed. 2012).
113 On the empirical difficulties, see Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the Marketplace of Ideas,
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).

SCHAUER GALLEYSPROOFS2

454

1/14/2016 2:26 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:427

democratic deliberation and decision-making,114 and some are based on the
importance in a democracy of using speech and the press as checks on the
possibility of governmental overreaching or other abuse of power.115 But what
most species of democracy-based accounts of free speech share is a nonreliance on the distinction between speech and action116 that is so central to
individualistic or autonomy-based accounts, whether they be based on listenerautonomy or speaker-autonomy or both. Listeners may secure information
valuable to their autonomy in countless ways, only some of which are based on
the propositions uttered by others. And speakers may embody their autonomy
also in countless ways, only some of which involve speaking in even the
broadest sense. There may be good historical reasons for carving out speech
from these broader categories, but if we set aside the history and the existing
legal or constitutional doctrine, we will discover that the non-historical reasons
for doing so—for distinguishing speech from action—do not stand up to close
analytic scrutiny.

114 E.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948);
ROBERT POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 157 (2014); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); Lillian BeVier, The First Amendment and
Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Robert
H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Frank A. Morrow,
Speech, Expression, and the Constitution, 85 ETHICS 235 (1975).
115 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521,
524.
116 And that is possibly why such accounts might better be situated as components of a broader protection
of democracy rather than as a self-standing right. See Austl. Cap. Television Pty. Ltd. v Commonwealth (1992)
177 CLR. 106, 244 (Austl.) (locating a freedom of political communication within the Australian
Constitution’s protection of democracy); Bork, supra note 54.

